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Introduction
The relationship between the European Union1 and
Africa has been formalised since the beginning of
the European integration project in the evolving
Yaoundé, Lomé and now Cotonou Agreements. The
relationship has shifted in line with the emerging
global framework for neoliberal accumulation. This
shift has involved the ‘re-designing’ of developmental
strategies and their ‘locking-in’ in the long term.
Theoretically, this global shift in the organisation of
both production and social relations (including
popular understandings) has been well documented
and the changing dominant patterns of production
in advanced industrial  economies has been
highlighted at length. However, this article aims to
develop further the idea of ‘locking-in’, outlined in
the work of Stephen Gill, and to place an increased
emphasis on the phenomena of both re-designing
and locking-in as they apply to the alteration of
developmental strategies in Less Developed Countries 
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(LDCs), among which those in Africa have suffered from extreme
marginalisation and exploitation. This article reveals the often ignored role
of the EU in this process. It argues that the EU, through its institutionalised
link with Africa, has played a key role in re-designing developmental strategies
to complement the global shift to neoliberal accumulation which, in its latest
phase, is aimed particularly at the complex, multifaceted and increasingly
integrated project to ‘lock-in’ the gains of capital over labour on a global
scale. The article begins with a brief introduction to the complementary
projects of ‘re-designing’ and ‘locking-in’ before considering these against the
historical evolution of the Lomé and Cotonou relationship.
Re-designing and locking in
This article uses an analytical model of locking-in developed from the work
of Stephen Gill to understand the evolution of the Lomé, then Cotonou trade
and aid relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) group of developing states. As applied here, this model is developed
to be explicitly multi-dimensional, reflecting the pursuit of this project across
the different aspects (or pillars) of capitalist hegemony, different spatial levels
and the differences between elements which are related to the dominance of
capital over labour per se and those that seek to manage that relationship at
any point in time and in the context of the balance of class power. Before
elaborating this analytical model, it is necessary to briefly introduce some of
the key concepts that underpin it.
Gill’s use of ‘locking-in’ is heavily influenced by the analysis of the structural
power of capital over the institutional framework of the state developed in
Charles Lindblom’s seminal 1977 work Politics and Markets.2 This concept
explains how the needs of capital are prioritised in public policy and the
management of the economy, especially over the long term, even in states
with all the formal trappings of democracy and the separation of powers.
Concrete examples of this structural power lie in the ability of capital to
withhold investment, either in the economy as a whole, thereby inducing
slower growth or recession, or from a specific government by withdrawing
support through government bonds and other short- and long-term government
financing mechanisms.3 The result, argues Gill, is that governments increasingly
HIMA 12,4_f9_202-230  1/25/05  4:57 PM  Page 204
Managing Development: EU and African Relations since ‘Lomé’ and ‘Cotonou’ • 205
4 Gill 1998.
5 Gill 1998, p. 1.
6 Gill 1998, p. 4.
have to prove the credibility and consistency of their policies to secure the
confidence of capital markets.4
Gill takes this analysis further, abstracting it to the global level and arguing
that, in an era of disciplinary neoliberalism, this structural power is increasingly
being written into legal and quasi-constitutional arrangements that extend
between states and multilateral institutions and more nebulous rules-based
frameworks, creating what he refers to as a ‘new constitutionalism’. For Gill,
the new constitutionalism is not only reflective of the hegemony of capital
over labour, but of a specific form of hegemony, influenced by the policy
dictates of neoliberalism and crucially offering a privileged position to specific
classes and class factions:
. . . new constitutionalism operates in practice to confer privileged rights of
citizenship and representation to corporate capital and large investors. What
is being attempted is the creation of a political economy and social order
where public policy is premised upon the dominance of the investor, and
reinforcing the protection of his/her property rights. The mobile investor
becomes the sovereign political subject.5
Gill draws heavily on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, as being self-reflexive,
actively constructed and incorporating both consensual and coercive features.
Neoliberal hegemony, Gill argues, is characterised by the pursuit of measures
to ‘reconfigure’ state apparatuses, and construct markets and measures to
deal with the dislocations created by the circulation of fictitious commodities.
This last category of characteristics of neoliberal hegemony draws significantly
upon Polyani’s idea of the ‘double movement’ to both extend commodification
and socialise the core elements of capitalist production, and can be broken
down into three sub-categories. These are: measures to protect against the
contradictions generated by the commodification of capital, to contain the
contradictions created by the commodification of land (that is, sustainable
development and other aspects of environmental protection), and measures
to contain the effects of the commodification of labour.6
Clearly, however, if the ‘locking-in’ of the policy prescriptions of neoliberal
hegemony is to take this form, then the structural power of capital over the
state must be significantly modified to allow the state to secure the necessary
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conditions for the reproduction of accumulation. Conceptually, this can be
accounted for via an understanding of the concept of the relative autonomy
of the state. This autonomy is possible, first, because various factions of capital
themselves do not share a singular and unified set of interests beyond the
structural dominance of capital over labour, and, second, by the reality of
class struggle in which the state becomes a mediating institution between capital
and labour:7
This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a
political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between
workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It
compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by
taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten
hours bill in England was carried.8
At any one time, then, the state has varying degrees of freedom from individual
fractions of capital and can broker alliances to intervene in the structural base
of the economy.
The state is able to play this role in organising and unifying the bourgeoisie
and the power of the bloc in so far as it enjoys relative autonomy of given
fractions and components, and of various political interests. Such autonomy
is indeed constitutive of the capitalist state: it refers to the state’s materiality
as an apparatus relatively separated from the relations of production, and
to the specificity of classes and class struggle under capitalism that is implicit
in that separation.9
Paul Cammack10 has recently applied this concept to the governance of global
capitalism, in which organisations and networks of organisations embody
the political autonomy conferred upon the state at the domestic level and
explains the conceptual underpinnings of the new constitutionalism. At this
level, relatively autonomous political authority takes shape in organisations
and institutions, more nebulous régimes of rules, dominant ideas and in the
form of multilateral treaties and agreements. Each of these operates at a
variety of spatial levels. This is the first dimension of locking-in and focuses
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analytical attention on the role of the management of global capitalism at
various spatial abstractions such as the global, macro-regional (that is, Europe,
East Asia, and so forth), national and sub-national levels, down to communities,
families and individuals.
The second dimension of ‘locking-in’ is demonstrated by giving more
explicit recognition to what is often implicit in Gill’s work: that locking-in
extends beyond the process of the formal constitutionalism that he identifies,
encompassing the requirements of neoliberal accumulation across a range of
‘pillars’ of hegemony. These include a technical/legal pillar, a social/socio-
psychological pillar and a political/institutional pillar.
In a technical-legal sense, locking-in involves the reconstruction of legal
frameworks which protect the rights of capital over a long and often defined
period. This is manifest for instance, in contract and property law (including
intellectual property) designed to guard against the expropriations that had
marked dependency and Keynesian-inspired development policies. This
technical-legal aspect is explicitly linked to change in the political and
institutional pillar. The result is to promote and build the interests of investors
into the rules of the system itself and therefore remove them from the everyday
political agenda. Crucially, such political change is intended to prevent an
easy (re)turn to alternatives to neoliberalism. This pillar is also the site of
reform of welfare systems and other institutions designed to mediate the
negative effects of accumulation and contain elements of the class compromise
that might otherwise drop out of the formal capitalist economy. The reform
of social systems in this way has been critical in the transition between the
early phase of neoliberal reform, focusing on austerity-based deconstruction
of prior structures of more developmental and Keynesian political economy,
and more recent reforms designed to expand the available pool of labour
and, more crucially, shift the focus of intervention to relative surplus-value
generation.
Social/socio-psychological locking-in refers to the management of social
practices, norms and expectations. For instance, throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank often
remarked on the importance of downgrading the expectations of subordinate
social groups and classes for redistribution of the social surplus of production.
Again, this example demonstrates how locking-in within each of the pillars
of hegemony combines and relate to one another. Socio/psychological locking-
in clearly relates to measures to undermine redistribution, either privately
HIMA 12,4_f9_202-230  1/25/05  4:57 PM  Page 207
208 • Alex Nunn and Sophia Price
11 World Bank 1991, p. 117.
12 European Commission 1992, pp. 8–11. Emphasis ours.
13 While the informal economy may be capitalist too, it is difficult for political
authority to manage and regulate and as such exists on the margins of hegemony
outside of the direct scope of measures to increase commodification and to contain
its contradictions.
through measures to lower wages relative to surpluses, or publicly through
measures to cut taxation and public spending. Both in the core and periphery,
this initially involved ‘austerity’ measures, including ‘cold bath’ reductions
in employment and public spending. As the World Bank and European
Commission have remarked illustratively of the transition economies of Eastern
Europe, the socio-psychological ‘shock’ of crisis is an important part of this
process:
Rapid action can improve the political sustainability of reform if it prevents
a joint assault by special interest groups. . . . Bold changes are especially
necessary if a government lacks credibility. . . . A conclusive reform can help
to reshape expectations about the government’s commitment and so contribute
to its success. Governments do well to capitalize on the broad, potentially
short lived mandate for reform that crisis confers by front loading the reform
program.11
Protracted and endemic shortages, inflation and hyperinflation are a great
problem but also mollify the population and reduce popular resistance to shock
therapy . . . unpopular measures should not be spread over time but taken
as quickly as possible.12
Again, austerity-based adjustments to social expectations form part of the
early phase of constructing neoliberal hegemony, with the major part of 
the focus on deconstruction of earlier manifestations of an alternative
developmental hegemony. More recently, locking-in has developed a more
sophisticated approach, mediated through the ideology of the Third Way,
promoted by strategically important politicians and states. In terms of 
social practices and expectations, this phase has not merely focused on 
coercive aspects of locking-in but has sought also to mobilise consensual
strategies. Shaped against the backdrop of fear of resistance to structural
adjustment and the rise of ‘dropping out’ of the formal economy,13 these
strategies have become a major element in the drive to expand and lock-in
commodification, particularly with regard to expanding the pool of available,
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flexible and competitive labour – Marx’s reserve army of labour – in strategies
designed to increase the rate of absolute surplus-value. These have been
combined with measures to raise expectations in relation to education 
and health care – so called pro-poor policies – to boost the quality of labour
inputs (and potential inputs) in measures designed to raise the rate of relative
surplus-value.14
As a result, development policies in the 1990s have increasingly been
presented as participatory, with a social dimension and owned by the domestic
population, and this has been reflected in the evolution of the Lomé and
Cotonou relationship. This has involved various strategies including involving
NGO partners in designing and implementing development programmes,
engendering entrepreneurship at an ever more grassroots level and
manipulating ideologies such as postmodernism and feminism to present
neoliberal re-designing and locking-in programmes as individually
empowering, in a process which is captured by Gramsci’s concept of
trasformismo.15
This leads to a consideration of the third dimension of locking-in. This is
that hegemony consists of ‘layers’, in which the most foundational and deeply
entrenched layer incorporates key elements of capitalist hegemony over labour,
such as individual property rights, practices of wage-labour and the acceptance
of contract law. Overlaid on this layer are more superficial elements of policy
design which capture the active strategies to support, extend and defend
accumulation in the particular context of the balance of class power. This
understanding helps to illuminate how it is that capitalist hegemony is
reconstructed in different formats but the central elements of exploitation and
unequal power remain.
This article argues that the Lomé/Cotonou relationship has embodied just
such a shift in hegemony, which has taken the form of a transition away from
the social-democratic compromise of the welfare and developmental state. It
is argued here that the active deconstruction of this compromise has been
characteristic of the evolution of the Lomé/Cotonou relationship as it has
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been shifted away from preferential trade and aid cooperation with a heavy
focus on developmentalism. This destructive element has taken the form of
structural adjustment and ‘re-designing’ of the state-society relationship in
the ACP. In its place, an alternative form of hegemony has been increasingly
reflected in the focus of the treaty, including measures to embed neoliberal
flexible accumulation and to offset its contradictions largely through the
adoption of the policy mantra of ‘poverty reduction’. The success of this
strategy has been determined by the ability of the EU and ACP to construct
supportive class alliances. Thus, the Lomé/Cotonou relationship has
increasingly incorporated measures designed to co-opt managerial and
bureaucratic élites in the ACP through formal training programmes and
institution building to facilitate ‘partnership’.
A further important element in the shift in hegemony more broadly, and
specifically in the Lomé/Cotonou agreements themselves, has been how the
interests of blocs of capital have been mediated by those of relatively
autonomous political authority at the level of the state, macro-region and
globally. A key feature of the early Lomé framework was the inclusion of
policies and measures which were clearly the product of demands from
individual EU states to protect the interests of nationally embedded blocs of
capital. It was this that led the agreements to be characterised in this early
period as neocolonial, reflecting the continuation of dependence and uneven
development without the formal trappings of imperialism. However, reflecting
Gill’s argument regarding the specific composition of neoliberal hegemony
as being increasingly dominated by the interests of finance capital, the
Lomé/Cotonou framework has taken a more generalised perspective of
capitalist interests.
In advancing re-designing of the ACP state-society relationship and locking-
in the policy prescriptions of neoliberalism, the EU-ACP relationship has
taken its place within the broader institutional project that Gill describes and
includes other important ‘partners’ such as the World Bank and IMF. Indeed,
careful examination of the provisions of evolving Lomé and Cotonou
agreements reveals that this relationship has often led the efforts of these
institutions, incorporating important policy innovations prior to their
appearance in the broader global development framework.
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16 Association applied to French West Africa (Dahomey, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Upper Volta), French Equatorial Africa
(Cameroon, Chad, Middle Congo, Gabon and Ubangi-Chari), other French territories
of the Autonomous Republic of Togo, Madagascar, Comoros, French Polynesia, French
Southern and Antarctic Territories, Algeria, Réunion, Guyanne, Martinique, Guadeloupe,
St. Pierre and Miquelon, French Somaliland, New Caledonia and Dependencies, Belgian
Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Italian Somaliland and New Guinea.
17 These linked the EC to eighteen Associated African States and Madagascar (AAMS)
(Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, People’s Republic of Congo
(formerly Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaïre (formerly Congo-
Kinshasa, Congo Leopoldville).
18 Curzon and Curzon 1971, p. 125; Gruhn 1976, p. 244; Ravenhill 1985, p. 33.
19 Green 1976, p. 5.
EU-African relations
The relationship between the EU and Africa dates back to the creation of the
EC, with Part IV of the 1957 Treaty of Rome outlining the framework for
‘association’ between the two regions, based on reciprocal preferential trade
and aid provisions.16 This framework was modified by the two successive
Yaoundé Conventions (1963–9 and 1969–74)17 in light of the move to
independence by many of the associated states. The relationship provided
the EC with a framework for the protection of economic and geopolitical
interests. This was particularly true for France, as the Association and Yaoundé
agreements represented devices to off-load French colonial mercantilism on
to the Community as a whole in return for receiving access to markets and
sources of supply. The relationship between the EC and this selective group
of Southern states was tainted by the criticism of neocolonialism, as decision-
making was unequal, colonial patterns of trade were little altered, per capita
incomes were not significantly raised, and the newly independent states were
kept in a position of economic and political dependence.18 Despite such
critiques, the relationship endured, as the newly independent states and their
ruling élites remained largely orientated to accepting neocolonial dependent
development.19
The framework of relations between the EC and Africa was expanded and
modified with the replacement of Yaoundé by the first Lomé Convention in
1975. UK accession to the EC necessitated the accommodation of links with
a wider group of ACP states and this phase of the institutionalisation of the
EU-ACP relationship was contextualised by the dominant conditions in the
global political economy at a time of commodity price booms, oil price hikes
and growing political instability in the core, as the postwar accumulation
régime faltered. Combined with rising Third-World militancy, this context
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20 African states controlled significant energy resources. Nigeria was the world’s
eighth largest oil producer, whilst the Congo, Gabon, Zaire, and Trinidad controlled
1,300 million tons of proven oil resources. Oil companies were exploring the Cameroon,
Dahomey, Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia. In light of increased European reliance on
nuclear energy, uranium supplies were of growing importance and were present
throughout Central Africa, with Gabon, Niger, the Central African Republic and Zaïre
all actually producing uranium. Gruhn 1976, p. 259. Furthermore ACP states were
important hosts for European investment, particularly from the former metropoles
whose corporations often enjoyed monopolies in the exploitation of mineral wealth.
For example, the French government owned seventy per cent of the capital of the
Equatorial Africa Oil Company (SPAFE) which exploited deposits in the Congo and
Gabon, and the French Atomic Energy Commission had a one-third interest in the
Air Mines Company (SOMAIR) created in 1967 to exploit Niger’s uranium deposits.
The French government was also involved in mining bauxite in the Cameroon,
manganese in Gabon and potash in the Congo. Ravenhill 1985, p. 37.
21 In reflection of the UN General Assembly’s 1974 Programme of Action for a New
International Economic Order.
22 Ravenhill 1985, p. 338.
motivated the EC to pursue a strategy to secure relations with valued overseas
markets, exporters of raw materials (especially oil-producing states), and
investment sites.20 As such, the new convention aimed to manage trade and
investment environments and to provide a response to the dependency debate
and calls for collective self-reliance and delinking. Hailed as an example of
the New International Economic Order (NIEO),21 it focused on the practical
issues surrounding North-South co-operation such as market access,
compensatory finance and the disbursement of aid. However, the EC refused
ACP demands for the inclusion of the specific elements of the NIEO agenda
such as ACP national sovereignty over natural resources, adjustment of EU
economies and a code of conduct for transnational enterprises.22
The first Lomé Convention reflected the dominance of dependency and
Keynesian-inspired demands for national developmental autonomy through
attempting to decommodify certain aspects of North-South relations. Price
stabilisation, grant aid, technology transfer and preferential market access
were all hailed as promoting Third-World interests and tessellated with
nationalised industrialisation. Aid was predominantly in grant form, without
the usual ‘strings attached’, while the trade régime provided preferential,
non-reciprocal access for certain ACP exports to the European market. This
interventionist approach to trade was supplemented by a system for the
stabilisation of exports (STABEX) and separate protocols guaranteeing prices
and quotas for certain commodities. While recognising the dependency of
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Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu).
25 European Commission 1995, p. 23.
many ACP states on a few primary commodities, these régimes supported
European MNCs heavily involved in the production of ACP exports.23
Re-designing and locking-in in the evolution of Lomé
Over the lifespan of the Convention, the EU-ACP partnership has grown to
include twenty-five European member states and seventy nine ACP states.24
It has been renegotiated every five years, with the latest negotiation in 2000,
seeing the relationship renamed the Cotonou Agreement. Within its evolution
there has been an emphasis, first, on re-designing the state-society relationship
and, later, locking-in development strategies in accordance with the policy
prescriptions of neoliberalism. The overarching framework for the EU-ACP
relationship has gradually been redefined, moving the agreement from a
redistributive, interventionist approach to one founded on the principles of
free trade and neoliberal orthodoxy. In large part, this has been due to the
dominance of the EU in the relationship and the embracing of the logic of
‘re-designing’ within both groups. This redefinition is evident in a number
of areas. The development discourse contained within the Convention changed
rapidly from one of interdependence, equality and redistribution to that of
participation in the global economy. By Lomé III (1983), the focus was explicitly
shifted from state, to private-sector-led development, with a central role
attributed to the individual, and was described as a ‘minimally interventionist,
catalytic form of assistance’.25 This approach was augmented under Lomé IV
(1989), which further embraced re-designing, decentralised co-operation based
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on civil-society participation, and individualised human rights. New provisions
sought to redefine the role of the state as ‘enabling’ private-sector development
in a number of ways. These included guaranteeing an open, transparent and
stable regulatory and political environment and the provision of appropriate
infrastructure, low labour and energy costs and supportive technical industries.26
Crucial to this was the demonstration of a ‘locked-in’ commitment to market-
based development.
Most recently, through the Cotonou Agreement, the EU-ACP relationship
has formally become part of a Third-Way-inspired global poverty reduction
strategy, embracing social and economic reform in partnership with the
institutions of global economic governance. The EU and its member states
are major creditors and donors to the IMF and World Bank-led Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the accompanying poverty reduction
strategies.27 The inclusion within Cotonou of an EU-ACP agreement to co-
operate on debt relief issues follows Council guidelines in 1996 which outlined
dominant themes in European development policy:
The policy in this area is a decisive factor in ensuring, in the context of tight
and efficient public finance management, a fair distribution of the fruits of
growth and access to basic social services such as education and health, and
in encouraging the emergence of an investment-friendly environment. Macro-
economic reforms can have sustainable effects only if they fully embrace
the objectives of social, human development.28
Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement embodies perhaps the most radical
element of reform in the re-designing of the Lomé development framework,
namely WTO compliance through the liberalisation of the non-reciprocal
preferential trade régime. This marks the latest stage in the ongoing
reconfiguration of the EU-ACP relationship and its coherence with the wider
global development framework, enshrining the principles of rules-based
multilateral liberalisation. Over time, the value of ACP preferential access has
been downgraded as the number of states covered by the agreement has
increased, while the EU has also extended its range of development co-
operation agreements outside the Lomé/Cotonou framework and has been
at the forefront of multilateral trade liberalisation. Furthermore, the Lomé
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preparatory period. The all EU-ACP negotiations began in 2000 with the second phase
of EPA negotiations beginning in 2003. It is expected that the new arrangements will
enter into force by 1 January 2008, with a 12–15 year transition period before becoming
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trade régime has done little but reinforce ACP dependence on the EU.
Combined with pressure for WTO compliance, as witnessed by the ‘banana
wars’, these factors provided the rationale for the replacement of the Lomé
régime by Cotonou’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the
EU and sub-regional groupings within the ACP. The basis of the new régime
is the subdivision of the ACP geographically and developmentally, through
the categorisation of a group of ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs) and a
group of richer middle-income countries (non-LDCs). EPAs based on free-
trade agreements are being established between the EU and the groups of
ACP non-LDCs considered in a position to do so.29 The EU ‘Everything But
Arms’ (EBA) initiative formally provides LDCs non-reciprocal duty-free access
to the EU market. However, in practice, the existence of regional groupings
within the ACP containing both LDCs and non-LDCs makes this differentiation
of treatment difficult.
Increased access to the EU market has been a principle that the ACP
have continually demanded since the original Lomé Convention, when it
became clear that the EC would protect its most sensitive sectors, such as
agriculture and textiles. However, in pursuing increased access to the EU
market, the ACP were unwilling to undergo reciprocal liberalisation. This 
proved irreconcilable with the EU’s vision of trade reform, based on full
GATT/WTO compliance. Gradually, the Lomé relationship has become fully
integrated into a global development framework based on a neoliberal
accumulation model.
Locking-in
Central to the neoliberal re-designing project have been locking-in strategies,
which are essential to secure such policy orientations over the long term. The
most obvious evidence of locking-in has been the creation and maintenance
of the Lomé/Cotonou relationship itself, by which ACP states have committed
themselves to a particular development framework under the management
of the EU. Locking-in has also been pursued through the increasing
conditionality attached to the provisions of the Conventions. This is an effective
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31 In contrast to the previous system, whereby the ACP state exchanged views with
the EC on development objectives and priorities, under Lomé III the European
Commission became involved in the preparatory stage. The Commission and main
providers of aid assess the ACP states’ economic and social situation, and identify
focal sectors. The programming mission, led by the Commission and the European
Investment Bank then creates an indicative programme with the national authorities,
setting out the sectors chosen, aid guidelines and the means of implementation.
European Commission 1986, p. 71.
32 Rubin 1978, p. 11.
33 European Commission 1990, p. 8.
strategy, given the level of reliance of ACP states on the Lomé relationship.
The conditional nature of the Convention built on the ongoing reforms of
Lomé’s financial protocol. The EC initiated such reforms when it engineered
the adaptation of the financial protocol’s dispersal mechanisms, particularly
with the introduction of sectoral programming under Lomé III (1983),
institutionalising a larger, more orthodox donor role for the EC, congruent
with the IMF and World Bank’s collective management of the debt crisis.30
Veiled in terms of increased efficiency, flexibility and co-ordination, 
the Commission’s remit was extended to the allocation of funds to 
individual states, the identification of sectors and programmes and policy
implementation.31 The shift from the project-oriented approach to support for
priority sectors or development ‘themes’ allowed the EC to expand its decision-
making role and re-design those parts of the ACP economies it wished to
promote. Historically, the EC had been extremely selective in terms of recipient
sectors and states. Little aid was given to support the production of goods
that might compete with European products, consequently, industrial funding
focused on energy supplies. Under Lomé I, over forty per cent of rural funds
were allocated to large agro-industrial projects, concentrating heavily on
primary export crops, with only a tiny sum allocated to value-added agricultural
and food processing.32 However, as the Convention matured, increasing focus
was given to facilitating local processing, enabling the management of
integrated production chains and the development of supportive class alliances.
Building on the sectoral approach, a specific structural adjustment support
facility was included in Lomé IV (1989) which was described as the first
‘North-South Agreement on the philosophy underlying structural adjustment’.33
This facility, prompted by the EC’s participation in the 1987 World Bank-led
Special Programme for Assistance to Africa, introduced an element of
conditionality to the financial protocol. This was a marked change but did
not undermine the attraction of EC grants, even with strings attached, in
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comparison to the loans offered by other donors. In 1991, structural adjustment
funds were withheld from fifteen states due to failure to adopt a satisfactory
economic reform programme, demonstrating that conditionality was
underpinned by effective disciplinary sanctions.34 Conditionality was formally
extended in 1995 to the observance of human rights, the rule of law and
democratic principles, using the twin tools of a suspension mechanism and
special allocations to bring Lomé further in line with the wider global
development framework and demonstrating both a consensual and coercive
aspect to the process.35 The inclusion of ‘political conditionality’ into the
Convention demonstrates mechanisms of technical/legal and political/
institutional locking-in. This was carried forward to the Cotonou Agreement
along with a greater emphasis on efficiency and hence an enhanced role for
the European Commission in project preparation and appraisal, particularly
through the introduction of performance-related tranching of disbursements.
Various measures within the Lomé/Cotonou relationship demonstrate the
technical/legal elements of locking-in, in order to protect the position of
capital over the long term and ensure a secure investment environment. The
Lomé Convention developed an investment framework which was hailed as
‘unprecedented in similar multilateral agreements’,36 and aimed to encourage
fair and equitable treatment for investors, clear, stable and predictable
investment conditions including insurance and guarantee systems. To
complement the framework, the EC accorded itself a facilitating role in
extending investment. In the late 1970s, such a role had been demanded by
a consortium of mining companies in response to the rapid decline of European
investment in Third-World mining, due in part to increased state control.37
The request to provide investment stabilisation and protection frameworks
in turn prompted the Commission to urge other institutions, such as the
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World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to widen their
stabilisation efforts.38 The EC’s investment facilitating role was explicitly
outlined as helping ACP states to re-design their domestic economies to
facilitate access to capital markets and encourage direct private European
investment particularly through sub- and joint-contracting.39 With the promotion
and facilitation of private foreign investment to the ACP, European development
policy was explicitly presented as a vehicle for the extension of European
capital in an increasingly competitive global economy while assuring secure
and diverse supplies of raw materials, particularly energy.40 The desire to
stimulate European economic growth converged with the needs of capital to
secure the most profitable locations in terms of market access, production
costs, raw materials and labour. Augmenting the contractual mechanisms that
ensured the technical/legal elements of locking-in to secure favourable
investment conditions was the inclusion of human rights as a fundamental
principle explicitly linked to development, particularly the rights of the
individual in comparison to notions of group and socio-economic rights.
The Lomé/Cotonou relationship has also featured socio-psychological
elements of locking-in. Early neoliberal conditionalities attached to structural
adjustment policies have not only ensured the political and institutional aspect
of locking-in, but have also had a psychological effect on society. Austerity
has shaped citizens’ expectations of the state and is crucial to the project to
dismantle prior forms of political economy. Under Lomé III, the move to a
framework promoting re-designing, the privileging of private enterprise and
the restoration of credit worthiness through export production included the
imposition of such austerity measures. However, the locking-in of neoliberal
hegemony has not merely been coercive. The realisation that the hard medicine
of structural adjustment could engender social unrest, prompted the EU to
develop a role under Lomé IV as supporter of Bretton-Woods-designed policies
of reform. As such, it sought to mitigate the effects of enforced public spending
cuts and liberalisation to ensure ‘that the social repercussions are tolerable
believing as it does that social development is an integral part of economic
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progress and the promotion of civil society and democracy in Africa’.41 This
role, described as that of ‘social fire-brigade’ by Hewitt,42 included increased
support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-projects,
and directing adjustment funds to public services, especially health and
education. Political and social sustainability was to be ensured through
decentralised co-operation and participation reflecting the increasingly Third-
Way developmental approach.43
In sum, the reconfiguration of the EU-ACP relationship has fitted with the
evolution of the global development framework which has, in turn, been
shaped by the changing needs of capital accumulation. Enforcing and
embedding the transition from nationalised production to providing conditions
favourable to securing private investment has been a key element of the
relationship, in compliance with the wider framework embodied in the
structural adjustment policies of the World Bank. Favourable investment
conditions were further promoted as the EU developed a partner role to
encourage European capital to invest in the ACP. Conditionalities were added
at the same time as entrenching the new orthodoxy for social and political
stability by incorporating a requirement to promote human rights, democracy
and the rule of law. However, despite EC attempts to lock-in political and
economic re-designing and the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI),
there have been ongoing difficulties in attracting capital to the ACP, with only
a handful of the more advanced and viable economies being successful in
this regard. While internal and external European policies have worked to
downgrade the value of ACP preferential access to the European market, the
pursuit of trade liberalisation embodied by the replacement of the Lomé
Convention by the Cotonou Agreement ensures WTO compliance. This has
significance beyond the agreement itself, as the Cotonou framework is, in
turn, important in ensuring the wider compliance of the developing world
with multilateral liberalisation.
Locking-in as a multi-levelled project
Locking-in is a complex and multi-levelled project that encompasses a host
of co-ordinated institutions and agreements at and between the global, macro-
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regional, national and sub-state levels.44 The latest phase of the EU-ACP
relationship has demonstrated coherence with the global development
framework by becoming an explicit facet of that strategy. This reflects the
ongoing expansion of the partnership, not only through the accession of
member states to each group, but also through the inclusion of other institutions.
Since the late 1970s, the EU has sought to include private investors and
financial institutions in the Lomé relationship in order to fund joint projects,
supplement stabilisation efforts and help spread risk. Contributors to these
‘triangular financing’ schemes were individual member states and the World
Bank, as well as OPEC investors in the late 1970s who were eager to recycle
petro-dollars. Despite ACP rejection of closer co-operation with the Bretton
Woods institutions, European policy has increasingly been made in co-
ordination with them ‘in the interests of policy effectiveness and of Western
co-ordination and solidarity’.45 This was particularly evident in the 1989 and
1995 Lomé Conventions, which clearly reflected World Bank structural
adjustment programmes, a set of policies that have long been a tool to enforce
re-designing, and institutionalised the inclusion of a social dimension to
reforms. Through this process, the EU, in conjunction with the Bretton Woods
institutions, sought to play two complementary roles, as both supporter and
enforcer of structural adjustment policies.
Regionalism and the new constitutionalism
The correlation between European and global development frameworks as
displayed through the Cotonou Agreement is further demonstrated in the
shared strategy to achieve WTO compliance, namely the creation of EPAs.
As such, it is a clear indication of the inter-linkages between global and
regional frameworks, through cross-cutting ties of a political, economic and
bureaucratic nature, and the complementary nature of locking-in strategies
pursued at global, regional, state and sub-state levels.
Regionalisation has been a continual focus of the evolving relationship
between the EU and the ACP, being presented as a strategy to maximise ACP
production and markets and facilitate joint ventures. Aspects of the latest
sub-regionalisation initiative embodied in the Cotonou Agreement have already
been manifest in the reform efforts of several African leaders, notably Thabo
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Mbeki of South Africa. ACP support for increased regionalisation based on
neoliberal orthodoxy is evident in the form of the existing regional organisations
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The objectives of these
organisations include the free movement of labour, goods, services, capital
and technology, macro-economic co-ordination and convergence, liberalisation
of external payments and convertibility, regional currency zones, promotion
of cross border investments, regional financial/capital stock exchanges, export
credit guarantee schemes and infrastructural development.46 As such, the
organisation of these regional groupings is characteristic of a new type of
open, outward-orientated regionalism designed to promote competitiveness
and integration within the global economy.47
This ‘new regionalism’ represents a substantial ‘locking-in’ of the dominant
neoliberal paradigm and surrenders important future policy options for
individual governments; options that may well be required in changing
national, regional or global circumstances.48 As with other aspects of the
locking-in project, the new regionalism has been promoted from within 
Africa as well as imposed from outside. It is one of the central principles of
the African-authored New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)
sponsored by South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Senegal, and promoted
extensively by the New Labour government in the UK.49 The ‘new regionalism’
provides a mechanism to lock-in the neoliberal development model into both
the state and civil society, providing the necessary political anchorage to
institutionalise the dominance of capital over the long term.
SADC exemplifies this new regionalism and specifically seeks to adjust
developmental needs to the challenges of the liberalised global economy
through a regional framework for development, diversification, productivity
and export capacity. Central to this strategy is to increase the ability of the
region to attract capital by displaying opportunities for trade and investment.50
However, in practice, regional integration under the leadership of South
Africa, has meant the penetration of the region by South-African and
international capital, under the leadership of the South-African government
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and rhetorical guise of an ‘African Renaissance’.51 As regional integration has
worked heavily towards the advantage of the South-African economy, persistent
concerns over South-African dominance and uneven gains in its’ favour have
become enhanced.52
The strategy to attract capital dovetails with Cotonou’s EPA agenda. This
is demonstrated by the initiation of negotiations between the EU and SADC
in July 2004,53 although engagement with this project has both promoted and
detracted from the coherence of Southern-African regionalism. The six SADC
member states that were also members of the Common Market for East and
Southern Africa (COMESA) have chosen to pursue an EPA as part of an
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) grouping.54 The remaining SADC states
have chosen to form a separate stand-alone EPA with the EU, with South
Africa adopting observer status to the negotiations. However, taking into
account the existing bilateral Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
(TDCA) between South Africa and the EU, applied de facto to Botswana,
Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (BNLS) via the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU), a free trade area is already in place. The complication arises
with the inclusion of Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania in the EPA as these
states are LDCs and as such are granted non-reciprocal preferential access to
the EU market via the EBA initiative.55
The complexity of membership between the burgeoning African regional
organisations displays their cross-cutting character. This is intensified by the
multiplicity of relations created with outside actors. For example, the open
nature of Southern-African regionalism has been further demonstrated by
proposals to create a free-trade agreement between the US and SACU under
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).56 Mbeki has been pro-
active in building links throughout the world, establishing strong relations
with Washington via the US-South Africa Bilateral Commission, being a
regular participant at gatherings of the G8, transnational meetings such as
the World Economic Forum and the Partnership Africa Conferences, and,
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more recently, the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in South
Africa. This reflects a desire to attract international capital to the region with
Pretoria presenting itself as a bridge between the developed world and the
South.
Through SADC, the deepening penetration of the region by the alliance of
domestic and transnational capital has gone hand in hand with the promotion
of transparency, good governance, security and democracy.57 This is further
reflected in South-African calls for the redefinition of the Organisation of
African Unity, now the African Union, and SADC as disciplinary organisations
to safeguard regional ‘security’. For example, through the creation in 1996 of
the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security: ‘The aim seemingly
promoted by Pretoria is to establish mechanisms to interfere in the internal
affairs of member states in the event of a breakdown in governance’.58 This
focus on security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention was integrated in
the Cotonou Agreement, further expanding the remit of EU-ACP relations
and ensuring a system of peer surveillance and discipline.
The heavy promotion of regional projects via Cotonou is an important part
of the multi-levelled locking-in project. The creation of cross-cutting and
intertwined institutions facilitates the extension of capital, exemplified by
burgeoning EU and US relations with SADC. While the formation of such
institutions will be problematic, the potential gains for capital are highly
significant.
Brokering class alliances: completing the world market for
capital, services and labour
Central to the multi-levelled analysis of re-designing and locking-in has been
the fostering of supportive class alliances across the core and periphery. Such
class alliances have been vital for the construction of globally integrated
flexible production chains, and in mitigating reactions to the establishment
of a global neoliberal accumulation model. Within the Lomé/Cotonou
relationship, European policy has emphasised the importance of ACP private-
sector development, aimed at engendering an entrepreneurial class and a
culture of enterprise. The EU looked to develop strategies to encourage capital
alliances and create supportive networks of foreign and local capital, officials
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and politicians. To do so, Lomé provisions sought to encourage the creation
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro-projects that could enter
into joint ventures with European capital.59 Through such schemes as sub-
contracting agricultural processing and partnerships between European and
local enterprises, SMEs can become vehicles for the strengthening of integrated
transnational production.60
The focus has been on the widespread adoption of an economic development
model designed to strengthen market forces, increase competition and refocus
the role of the state as an enabler and contractor rather than a direct economic
agent. The private sector is perceived as an engine of economic growth in
the ACP countries and its development has been closely associated with the
achievement of the major objectives of development co-operation, such as
sustainable economic and social development, integration into the world
economy and poverty alleviation. As such, the Lomé/Cotonou relationship
has helped to promote the necessary elements of global neoliberal accumulation.
In support of a nascent enterprise culture, the Lomé Convention included
a focus on enterprise development, aimed at restructuring the productive
base of the ACP. The particular emphasis on the local processing, marketing,
distribution and transport of raw materials represented a combination of ACP
concern for local processing and the promotion of opportunities for European
investment. In 1998, the Commission introduced a new strategy for private-
sector development in the ACP, in order to provide a more co-ordinated and
comprehensive approach to the specific constraints of the ACP countries and
regions.
Alliances between foreign and domestic capital and the state have been
fostered by encouraging organisations, such as the African Employer
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Organisation, to facilitate co-operation, aided by institutions created to meet
this aim.61 Primary amongst these has been the Centre for Industrial
Development (CDI), established with the explicit aims of promoting joint
ventures, sub-contracting, the export of expertise and technology and co-
operation between ACP and European states and business interests.62 The
aim of creating ‘durable partnerships’, especially joint ventures, was that:
. . . the ACP firm gains access to the European partner’s industrial and
managerial expertise, his technical and financial know-how and even access
to his partner’s markets. The advantage for the EU company is his partner’s
knowledge of local markets, access to local raw materials and a stake in an
existing business and workforce.63
The CDI-assisted ACP companies to choose appropriate European partners
and to locate sources of finance (development financial institutions, export
credit facilities, share capital). This was based upon the assumption that
prospects for other sources of private lending would be enhanced by such
partnerships.
The CDI was expanded under Cotonou to become the Centre for the
Development of Enterprise (CDE), reflecting the increased importance of the
service sector. Trade promotion and the development of services, particularly
tourism, information technology and communications, have been increasingly
highlighted as areas of growth potential and interest to European capital,
with the Convention including provisions to liberalise these sectors. Investment
guarantees and re-insurance schemes for FDI were designed to reduce risk
and induce private capital flows by boosting investor confidence, with specific
investment protection and promotion agreements concluded between EU and
ACP member states. The objectives of the newly expanded CDE are to bring
together ACP and EU capital, promote partnerships between ACP and EU
contractors, inform EU capital of investment and business opportunities and
support regional integration. Sectors eligible for such support are industry
and agricultural processing, construction, tourism, telecommunications,
transport, the private management of infrastructure and support services.
The emphasis on building alliances between Europe and the ACP has been
reflected in the ongoing focus on decentralised co-operation and building
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links between social and economic partners. There is also a continuation of
the desire to prevent and mitigate the social conflict that might arise from
re-designing and locking-in. The expectation is that such a strategy would
produce the supportive political coalitions and stability necessary for the
continued expansion and reproduction of capital.64 Additionally, supportive
measures included the targeting of adjustment funds to social services,
especially health and education.65 This strategy has been augmented under
the Cotonou Agreement to include provisions related to peace building and
conflict prevention which aim to secure conditions for investment and
accumulation. Again, this fits with the broader global development agenda
and in respect to the liberalisation of public services (under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services in the WTO) is noticeably similar to UK
government attempts to make its domestic markets a home for a newly
emerging band of service companies. In this context, provisions globally and
within the Cotonou relationship to link liberalisation and institutional re-
designing of the state around the enabling model may appear to be an attempt
to make the world safe for European capital. As Cammack has argued, 
with reference to the title of an influential UK Department for International
Development White Paper, other measures to secure investment conditions
at the same time as the adoption of pro-poor policies and poverty reduction
look rather like an attempt to make ‘the poor work for globalisation’.66
Poverty reduction, or, in the case of the UK, ‘elimination’, is a crucial element
of class politics not only within the EU-ACP relationship but between the
developed and developing world more generally. It has become the dominant
theme of World Bank development programmes, as contained within the
World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Strategy approach and NEPAD, and is focused particularly on
completing the world market for labour.67 The vehicle for poverty reduction
is portrayed as increased integration in the global economy through trade
and capital liberalisation and attracting inward investment through an enabling
state capable of providing an attractive, compliant and skilled workforce.68
The result, globally, is to guarantee an excess supply of labour in the interests
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of maintaining an adequate and sufficiently pliant global workforce for
integrated transnational production with an internally competitive, and thus
fragmentary, dynamic designed to boost and secure absolute surplus-value.
Measures to improve the quality of labour inputs aim to complement this by
raising the rate of relative surplus-value.
Conclusion
The evolution of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements has complemented the
global shift to neoliberal accumulation. Through these agreements, the EU
has played a lead role in re-designing the development strategies of African
states and has been central to the ‘locking-in’ project that enshrines those 
re-designed strategies into technical-legal, political-institutional, socio-
psychological frameworks at a host of levels, including domestic political
economies and inter-regional agreements. The way in which these levels
overlap and fit together is central to a nascent global constitution for neoliberal
accumulation, where policy alternatives are restricted to those beneficial to
accumulation. Over time, the aims of this global constitutionalism, including
the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, have centralised not only the expansion
of the world market in primary commodities and finished goods, but 
now also the completion of a world market for services, capital and labour
as well. This represents the expansion of commodification to new and
unprecedented levels.
Neoliberal global constitutionalism is not an unproblematic project and has
resulted in widespread unease, as witnessed by global mass protests, located
at meetings of world leaders and the key global institutions (including the
EU). However, this article has demonstrated that the construction of capitalist
hegemony is highly self-reflexive. At key junctures, interventions have sought
to defend and shore up the dominance of capital. The early phase of neoliberal
ascendancy was marked by strategies to deconstruct the class basis of opposition
through structural adjustment and austerity. More recently, the increased
focus on poverty reduction and pro-poor policies has demonstrated a fear of
‘dropping-out’ of the capitalist economy and more inclusive and participatory
forms of development strategies witness a desire to build supportive alliances
behind this project. Ironically, however, the inherent rigidity represented in
the institutionalised structures of ‘locking-in’ may well undermine the ability
of neoliberal hegemony to respond in the future to the pressures of instability
and change.
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